Abstract-Time Petri nets (TPNs) are a popular Petri net model for specification and verification of real-time systems. A fundamental and most widely applied method for analyzing Petri nets is reachability analysis. The existing technique for reachability analysis of TPNs, however, is not suitable for timing property verification because one cannot derive end-to-end delay in task execution, an important issue for time-critical systems, from the reachability tree constructed using the technique. In this paper, we present a new reachability based analysis technique for TPNs for timing property analysis and verification that effectively addresses the problem. Our technique is based on a concept called clock-stamped state class (CS-class). With the reachability tree generated based on CS-classes, we can directly compute the end-to-end time delay in task execution. Moreover, a CS-class can be uniquely mapped to a traditional state class based on which the conventional reachability tree is constructed. Therefore, our CS-class-based analysis technique is more general than the existing technique. We show how to apply this technique to timing property verification of the TPN model of a command and control (C2) system.
in the design and implementation of such systems. Petri nets, for their ability to model these properties, become a suitable model for modeling and analysis of this class of systems [3] , [12] . Several extended models of Petri nets were proposed to deal with the timing issues [16] . These models include timed Petri nets [13] , [20] , stochastic timed Petri nets [7] , and time Petri nets (TPNs) [11] . Among these models, TPNs are a most widely used model for real-time system specification and verification [3] , [6] , [15] , [17] , [18] . In TPNs, event synchronization is represented in terms of a set of pre-and post-conditions associated with each individual action of the modeled system, and timing constraints are expressed in terms of minimum and maximum amount of time elapsing between the enabling and the execution of each action. This allows a compact representation of the state space and an explicit modeling of concurrency and parallelism.
A fundamental and most widely applied method for analyzing Petri nets' models, like for many other formal models, is reachability analysis. It permits the automatic translation of behavioral specification models into a state transition graph made up of a set of states, a set of actions, and a succession relation associating states through actions [3] , [5] . This representation makes explicit such properties as deadlock freedom and reachability [19] , and allows the automatic verification of ordering relationships among task execution times [4] , [15] .
However, the existing techniques for reachability analysis of TPNs is not well suited for dealing with the end-to-end timing issues that are critical to real-time systems. Reachability analysis of TPNs is currently based on the concept of state classes [2] , [3] , a mechanism that groups time-dependent system states into equivalence sets in terms of the same discrete states characterized by TPN markings, so as to reduce the state explosion problem. A state class is composed of a marking and a firing domain, which is defined as the union of the firing domains of all states in the state class. The firing domain in a state class is relative to the moments at which transitions are enabled. However, the value of the time at which the transitions are enabled is unknown. The problem with this relative-time firing domain is that there is no clear way to calculate the end-to-end time needed for or required of task execution in the system being modeled. In particular, linear addition of the transitions' firing intervals between two adjacent state classes in the reachability tree of a TPN cannot result in the time span between the two state classes. Consequently, reachability tree based on such a state class concept does not give sufficient information required for the timeliness analysis or timing verification of modeled systems. (See Section II for more details.) In order to derive the time span information, one has to repeat the reachability analysis in a different way based on the obtained reachability tree [3] . In ensuing discussion, we refer to a state class used in [2] as a traditional state class.
In this paper, we present a new reachability analysis technique for TPN models that effectively addresses the problem described above. Our technique is based on a concept called clock-stamped state class (CS-class), which not only groups system states into compact representation of state classes, but also records the time, relative to the beginning of system execution, when such states are reached. In particular, a CS-class consists of three parts: 1) a marking that represents a logical state of the modeled system; 2) a "global" firing domain corresponding to firing intervals, whose values are counted relative to the beginning of the net's execution, of all firable transitions in the state class; and (3) a clock stamp that corresponds to the moment when the state class is reached with the clock value relative to the beginning of the execution. We present an algorithm to construct the reachability tree of the TPN based on the CS-class concept. With the reachability tree generated based on CS-classes, we can straightforwardly compute the time span between any two reachable CS-classes, thus the end-to-end time delay in task execution. Moreover, a CS-class can be uniquely mapped into a traditional state class, but not vice versa. Therefore, the CS-class based analysis method is more general than the traditional state class-based analysis method given in [2] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present our CS-class based reachability analysis technique for TPN models. In Section III, we illustrate the application of this technique to timing property verification of the TPN model of a command and control (C2) system. Section IV concludes the paper.
II. TIMELINESS ANALYSIS OF TPN MODELS
In this section, we first give a brief introduction to TPNs and the traditional state class concept. After pointing out the problem associated with this concept, we proceed to present the formal definition of CS-class for TPNs and define transition firing rules, which guide the construction of the reachability trees of TPNs based on CS-classes. We then show how the reachability trees can be used for timing property analysis of TPN. In addition, the following interval arithmetic will be used later: Let and , with . Then we define to be the interval and to be .
A. Time Petri Nets
A TPN is a tuple SI where 1) is a finite nonempty set of places.
2)
is a finite nonempty set of transitions.
3)
is the backward incidence function.
4)
is the forward incidence function. is the firing domain of the class, which is defined as the union of the firing domain of all the states in the class. A transition is firable from class if is enabled by marking , and may fire before the minimum of all LFT's related to all enabled transitions. For detailed firing rules see [2] .
The concept of state class helps generate reachability tree [2] . In a state class, the firing domain is relative to the epoch when the marking of the class is reached, whose value is not known in the reachability tree. Because of its relative domain, such a state class concept, however, cannot directly provide any information about time span between any two classes and where can be reached from . This is because linear addition of the firing intervals of the transitions that lead the net from state class to state class cannot result in the time span between the two state classes. Let us take the simple TPN shown in Fig. 1(a) as an example. As we see, transitions and are concurrent, and starting from the initial state the net may take any time in interval to reach the marking . Fig. 1 (b) shows the reachability tree based on classic state classes. There are two schedules leading the net to marking that are characterized by firing sequences and . Under the first firing schedule, plus gives , and under the second schedule, plus gives : none of the two results gives the correct time interval that leads the net from the initial marking to . In the next section, we present the concept of CS-class that leads us to solve the problem. is a marking . 2) is a firing domain, i.e., a set of constraints on the values of the time to fire for transitions enabled by current marking . For an enabled transition represents its firing interval. Let EFT be the left bound of (the earliest firing time) and LFT be the right bound of (the latest firing time). 3) ST is the time stamp of the CS-class, which is a (global) time interval. 
B. Clock Stamped State Classes

1) Transition Firing Rules:
Step 1) Calculate , the feasible firing intervals of the firing transition . It is achieved by shifting right bound of to MLFT while keeping its left bound unchanged, i.e.,
EFT MLFT
(2) 
Step 
Note that by Step 3.3), a transition that is still enabled after its own firing, is always treated as a newly enabled one. This simplifies the treatment of states in which a transition has sufficient tokens in its input places to permit multiple firings. The treatment of this condition, usually referred to as multiple enabledness [2] , requires that multiple firing intervals be associated with a single transition and involves a number of semantic subtleties that are not relevant to the objective of this paper.
Example 1: Consider a simple TPN model, shown in Fig. 2 . The initial CS-class is 
ST SI ST
Following this way, we can generate the reachability tree of the example TPN, which is depicted in Fig. 3 .
C. Timeliness Analysis of TPN Models
We have described the transition firing rules that guide the evolution of CS-classes in Section II-B. Below, we are to show the benefits that the new concept of state classes brings us. Fr is exactly the static firing time interval of , which is also the global firing time, and 2) ST , which is the arriving time of . Therefore, the assertion of the theorem holds for . Now assume that the assertion holds for . Consider . It follows from (2) and (3) that
ST
EFT MLFT
In (7) The conclusion of Corollary 1 can be directly used for timeliness analysis. As mentioned in [15] , the key issue of timeliness analysis is to verify whether a marking can be reached with timing constraints. Corollary 1 shows that the concept of CS-classes helps establish quantitative timing relationship between any two reachable classes when creating the reachability tree. is ST , and from to is ST . Suppose that we have a timing constraint that asks the absorbing marking , in which classes , and stay, must be reached within 150 time units from the initial marking, then we know that the constraint is satisfied.
Example 3: Applying the CS-class reachability analysis method to the TPN shown in Fig. 1 , we get the reachability tree as shown in Fig. 4 . From the reachability tree we find that the marking can be reached from via two firing sequences:
(left branch) and (right branch). The time span via the first sequence is and the second sequence . Therefore, marking can be reached within . Obviously, it gives the correct end-to-end time delay.
The next theorem shows that a CS-class can be uniquely mapped into a traditional state class. It is an interesting property, because it reveals two facts: 1) CS-class-based analysis method is as effective as the traditional method given in [2] in constructing reachability tree, because no extra node is introduced in the tree; and 2) CS-class-based analysis method has all advantages that traditional state class based analysis method has gained. Fig. 2 again. According to Theorem 2 and based on the model's CS-class-based reachability tree shown in Fig. 3 , we can easily compute the traditional state class-based reachability tree, which is shown in Fig. 5 . This traditional state class-based reachability tree can also be computed by the use of state class enumeration method given in [2] .
To facilitate the timeliness analysis of TPNs, we implemented a software tool named TPNm&a. The tool is coded in C++ and developed with UIM/X (professional edition), and presently runs on Solaris.
III. TIMING PROPERTY VERIFICATION OF A C2 SYSTEM
In this section, we show the application of CS-class-based reachability analysis to the verification of timing properties of a command and control (C2) system. 1 A C2 system is a distributed modularized system. It achieves mission success by executing a set of generally accepted C2 functions in an asynchronous manner. A simplified but typical structure of a tactic anti-air C2 system with two levels of command and control centers is shown in Fig. 6 , which consists of one first-level command center (indicated as C2 Center) and two second-level command centers (indicated as Sub-Centers). A pair of (C2 Center, Sub-Center) may be (division, regiment) or (brigade, battalion). They are geographically dispersed due to environmental and survivability reasons, which contributes to the distributed architecture of C2 organization.
A. Requirements of the C2 System
The operation of the system is described as follows. 1) Each radar group is composed of three air radars and a data processor. The specification is -Each radar senses air targets every 30 time units (TU). -
The data from the three air radars are fused at the processor, which takes two to four TU. -
The fused data are coded (taking two to four TU) and sent to their corresponding sub-center (taking one to two TU).
2) The C2 Center is composed of three seats: two intelligence seats and one decision-making seat. The behavior specification of this component is as follows: -
The two intelligence seats communicate with the decision-making seat through a common memory. -
The messages from three sub-centers are first copied and dispatched to the two intelligence seats. The two actions together take one to two TU. -
The two intelligence seats then do situation assessment based on these messages to achieve a relatively more precise situation figure (taking three to five TU), and 1 Notice that the timing data in this case study is artificial and does not reflect actual data in a real system. then make threatening assessment independently for each target and send the results to the decision-making seat. The two actions together take three to five TU. -
The decision-making seat works on a scheme of battle planning (taking five to six TU). The result is sent to the three sub-centers (taking one to two TU). 3) Each sub-center is composed of an intelligence seat and a decision-making seat. The behavior specification of this component is as follows. -
The intelligence seat receives message from its radar group and conducts target discrimination, identification and tracking, and further conducts threatening assessment, then sends the result to the C2 center. It takes two to three TU. -After receiving the scheme of battle planning from C2 center, the sub-center fuses it with related data in its database (taking one to two TU) so as to form a detailed scheme of weapon-to-target assignment (taking five to seven TU). Then, the results are sent to fire units (taking one to two TU). 4) The specification of a Fire Unit is as follows.
When the scheme of weapon-to-target assignment arrives from its sub-center, it conducts engagement con-trol (taking four to six TU) and sends fire command to weapons (taking one to two TU). -Then, it conducts damage assessment (taking five to seven TU), and feed backs the assessment results to its corresponding sub-center in time (taking one to two TU). In this example, we focus on timing requirements including: (R1)
The system reaction time, i.e., the time delay from a message regarding enemy intelligence being received by any subcenter to a fire command against the enemy being issued by a corresponding fire unit, must be less than or equal to 45 time units. (R2)
Since a C2 system is a closed-loop system, a constraint reflecting the time limitation for the feedback of damage assessment results should be included. This is captured by the requirement that the time delay from a detailed firing assignment scheme made by a sub-center to the result of the damage assessment referred to the execution of this scheme received by the same sub-center must be less than or equal to 20 time units. (R3)
Since the bottleneck for information processing is often located in the C2 Center, the center is always asked to respond quickly. This is captured by the requirement that the whole processing time for a group of messages from the three sub-centers must be less than or equal to 22 time units.
A C2 system is a real-time information processing system. Obtaining targets' information timely and continuously is extremely important to win a war. This is captured by the requirement that each Radar Group outputs targets' information periodically at a period of 40 time units. In order to simplify analysis, we also assume both sub-centers have identical topology and timing properties, and all the two fire units have identical topology and timing properties.
B. TPN Model of the C2 System
According to the structure and operation rules described above, we build the system's TPN model as shown in Fig. 7 . Table I gives its description. The TPN model is composed of seven subnets, each of which corresponds to a component. Transitions , and serve as connectors among the components, and places RG1.MSG, RG2.MSG, C2C.R1, C2C.R2, C2C.S1, C2C.S2, SC1.SI, SC2.SI, SC1.RM, SC2.RM, SC1.RI, SC1.SM, SC2.SM, FU1.S, FU2.S, FU1.R, and FU2.R serve as communication ports of the components.
C. System Verification
The verification is driven by showing satisfaction of timing requirements, which is monitored during the construction of reachability tree, and terminated as soon as the goal is reached. This avoids the generation of a complete reachability tree and thus improves the efficiency.
In fact, we can use a submodel to analyze a timing requirement. The submodels used to analyze the four timing requirements listed in Section III-A are depicted in Figs. 8-11 .
Let us take the analysis of requirement R3 as an example. The initial marking is shown at the bottom of the page. Define marking such that (see the second equation at the bottom of the page). Applying reachability analysis described in Section II gives the following CS-classes: 
ST ST
C2C.R1 C2C.R2 p101 p102 p103 p104 C2C.S1 C2C.S2
C2C.R1 C2C.R2 p101 p102 p103 p104 C2C.S1 C2C.S2 C2C.S1, C2C.S2
ST
As we see, the time delay interval that the model takes to move from marking to is ST ST
. It implies that the timing requirement R3 is proven satisfied.
Using the same technique, we can prove requirements R1 and R2 satisfied based on Figs. 8 and 9 , respectively. Now, we consider requirement R4. Reachability analysis shows that the TPN model dipicted in Fig. 11 has infinite markings (see equation at the bottom of the page). However, the reachability set has the following properties: 1) places p201-p207 are safe; 2) when each of transitions and fires one time, a token is deposited in place RG1.MSG; and 3) if each of transitions and fires times, or tokens must have been deposited in place RG1.MSG. Based on these properties, it is easy to see that the net exhibits the same behavior from marking to marking as from marking to marking . We can easily derive that the time for marking to be p201 p202 p203 p204 p205 p206 p207 RG1.MSG reached from the initial marking is . So the requirement R4 is satisfied. Now, all requirements are verified.
IV. CONCLUSION
A new reachability-based analysis technique for TPN is presented. It is based on a concept called clock-stamped state class (CS-class). With the reachability tree generated based on CS-classes, we can straightforwardly compute the end-to-end time delay in task execution. Moreover, a CS-class can be uniquely mapped to a traditional state class based on which the conventional reachability tree is constructed. Therefore, the CS-class-based analysis technique is more general than the existing technique. A command and control system is used as an example to show the timing property verification procedure.
Currently, we are working on a compositional timing property verification technique, which helps to control the complexity of large-scale real-time system analysis. We have developed a set of component-level reduction rules for TPNs in [17] .
